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STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant submits this Reply Brief pursuant to Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
Issue Raised in Appellee's Brief: Does Washington City's decision to 
dramatically increase the water pressure in certain areas without providing notice to residents in 
those areas meet the standard for discretionary function immunity under § 63-30-10(1) (repealed 
2004) of the Governmental Immunity Act? 
Standard of Review: Correctness 
A party's entitlement to discretionary function immunity under the Governmental 
Immunity Act is a question of law. See Lanev v Fairview City, 57 P.3d 1007, 1013 (Utah 2002). 
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. See Gordon vMaughan, 204 P.3d 189, 
191 (Utah App. 2009), Ward v Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990), Ron Case Roofing 
and Asphalt Paving Inc. vBlomquist, 11 o P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Simply stated, even if the Appellee's actions in installing new water lines are determined 
to be a fire fighting activity as Appellee claims, the A.ppellee's actions fall under the waiver to 
the Governmental Immunity Act contained in § 63-30-10(1) (repealed 2004), and do not meet 
the standard necessary for the City to demonstrate that its actions were excepted from that waiver 
by involving a discretionary function. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO THE WAIVER OF GOVERNMENT 
IMMUNITY DOES NOT APPLY TO APPELLEE'S ACTIONS IN THE INSTANT MATTER 
Application of the Governmental Immunity Act (Act) requires a three-step analysis. 
Johnson v Utah Department of Transportation, 133 P.3d 402, 406 (Utah 2006). '"First, we must 
decide if the Act affords immunity through its blanket immunization. Lgnev, 2002 UT 29, [^ 11, 
57 P.3d 1007.). Second, we must determine if the Act waives immunity given the particular 
circumstances of the case. Id^ Third, we must consider if the governmental action qualifies for 
an exception to the waiver of immunity. Id. " 
A. Appellee's act is not immunized under the Government Immunity Act as it is 
included in the waiver of governmental immunity included in §63-30-10(1). 
As a governmental act deliberated on by its officials, Wellington City's decision to install 
a new water line qualifies under the Governmental Immunity Act's blanket immunity. However. 
the act is excepted from that immunity by §63-30-10(1) as discussed in Appellant's Brief. 
B. Appellee's act is not a discretionary function excepted from the waiver of 
governmental immunity because the act was an operational decision not 
involving a policy-making function. 
Appellee contends that even if governmental immunity is waived under §63-30-10(1), it 
is excepted from that waiver by the immunity extended to those government actions that are 
discretionary functions. (See Appellee Brief pg. 171) 
The Court held in Nelson v. Salt Lake City that "Discretionary immunity is a distinct, 
more limited form of immunity and should be applied only when a plaintiff is challenging a 
governmental decision that involves a basic policy-making function." ~ 
Further, the Court reads discretionary function exceptions to the limited liability waiver 
narrowly/ and government actors claiming such immunity "must make a showing that a 
1
 While Appellee actually cites to §63-10-10(1), Appellant presumes for purposes of this Reply Brief that citation to 
that code section was a simple typographical error, and Appellee intended to cite to §63-30-10(1) as §63-10-10 has 
been repealed since 1981 and did not deal with discretionary function immunity.) 
2
 Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996) 
3
 Johnson v. Utah Department of Transportation, 133 P.3d 402, 406 (Utah 2006)(stating, "This Court has always 
read the discretionary function exception to the limited liability waiver narrowly. To do so otherwise would allow 
the exception to swallow the rule." ). (citing Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1996)) 
conscious balancing of risks and advantages took place." With the key being, that '"government 
actually exercises a level of discretion in a manner that implicates policy-making and thrusts the 
decision into the political process." Johnson v. Utah Department ofTransvortation, 133 P.3d 
402, 407 (Utah 2006). 
However, as demonstrated by numerous casesD, the Court has determined that 
discretionary function governmental immunity does not extend governmental immunity to 
operational decisions that are the ^ministerial implementation"6 of a policy decision. 
In Appellee's Brief, Appellee compels the Court to accept its rationale that the 
installation of a new water line is necessarily a fire-fighting function, and that the department 
engaged in "department wide consideration, evaluation, and weighing of policies that entitle a 
municipality to discretionary function immunity" in making the decision to install a new water 
line to increase water pressure in higher elevations. (See Appellee Brief, pg. 17) 
In the instant matter, even if Appellant were to accept that the Appellee engaged in a 
balancing decision to determine the necessity of increasing water pressure to higher elevations, 
Appellee has failed to demonstrate that it engaged in a similar deliberative process to determine 
the method by which that objective was to be accomplished nor did it undertake to determine 
whether or not residents in effected areas should be notified of their decision and the actions 
resulting therefrom. 
C. Appellee had a duty to provide adequate notice to x4ppellants and failed to do 
so. 
4
 Little v Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983) 
5
 Carroll v State of Utah by and Through its Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (Utah 1972) , Little v 
Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), Johnson v Utah Dept ofTransp., 133 P.3d 402 
(Utah 2006), Nelson v Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) , Laney v Fairview City, 51 P.3d 1007 (Utah 
2002) 
6
 Carroll v State of Utah by and Through its Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 389; 496 P.2d 888, 892 (Utah 
1972) 
In its brief, Appellee contends that ;*[I]f the Court does not interpret subsection (18)(b) to 
shield the City from liability under the facts of this case, it has effectively ruled that the City 
should have done nothing, and waited instead to find its immunity on the scene of an inferno as 
water trickles from the hose while property is engulfed in flames and lives are in danger?" While 
Appellee's statement indeed paints a vivid picture of the potential consequence of failing to 
provide adequate fire department protection, Appellee completely ignores the damage already 
done to Appellants' property by Appellee's actions—damage which likely could have been 
avoided had Appellee simply given Appellants adequate notice of their intentions. Further, 
Appellant posits, how is it any less dangerous to public safety to have a homeowner's plumbing 
explode from excessive pressure than to have it bum from a lack of it? 
In Carroll v. State, the Court determined thai discretionary function immunity did not 
apply to the State in an automobile accident caused by the decision of a road supervisor to use a 
particular form of barrier and a failure to warn drivers of the upcoming road impairment, which 
were deemed operational level decisions. In a concurring statement, Judge J. Crockett wrote 'In 
this case there was no place for discretion to give or not to give an adequate warning to the 
motoring public. The duty on the part of the State to give and maintain a reasonably adequate 
warning was absolute."7 
A similar rationale should be following in the instant matter. The Appellee had a duty to 
warn residents and thev failed to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those contained in Appellant's Brief, this Court should 
// 
1
 Carroll v State of Utah by and Through its Road Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 391; 496 P.2d 888. 893 (Utah 
1972) 
reverse the District Court's decision to grant the Appellee summary judgment. 
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